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Abstract The authors reflect on the commentators’ com-
ments and add some additional thoughts about the current
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When we started to review and assess the research domain
previously referred to as behavioral pricing research, little did
we realize the actual scope, extent and significance of this
research area since its beginning. While Kent has been in-
volved in behavioral price research for more years than he
admits, and has contributed to its expanding reach, neverthe-
less it became clear early on that it would take multiple essays
to review and assess this research domain. As the commenta-
tors have observed, there is still a need for muchmore research
to understand how people perceive and respond to prices and
price information. At the outset of this reflection, we reiterate
that the concept of buyers’ behavioral responses to price really
is the core of this field of research.
While it may seem a trivial point to some, we want to
affirm that the research area in question should be called
behavioral “price” research because at the core of the research
is the variable of “price” and not a study of “pricing” as a
practice. Moreover, although psychology remains one major
part of the research domain, it is broader than price psychol-
ogy (Thomas 2013). There are also cultural, sociological, as
well as economic aspects to the underlying issue of how
people perceive, process and respond to price information
(Rao 2013). Consequently, labeling this area of inquiry as
behavioral price research is more inclusive and accurate.
Why should one take the time and effort to review and
appraise an area of research? In a nutshell, it is less about
determining what we may know about the underlying area of
interest but rather, as the commentators indicate, it is more
about documenting what we do not know and thereby, hope-
fully guide future research efforts. In most areas of inquiry,
knowledge grows by bits and pieces, and generally, in a
somewhat haphazard way. Individual research efforts, though
relatively small in the overall scheme of things, nevertheless
can have a large cumulative effect. Unfortunately, researchers
are not rewarded well, either by their peers or institutions, to
integrate a disparate set of research efforts within a research
domain. Sadly, in marketing, the documenting of what we
know and do not know is infrequently accomplished. As the
commentators note, previous reviews such as that by Monroe
(1973) and Monroe and Lee (1999) have spurred additional
research on issues related to how price information influences
buyer behavior. It is in this vein that we aim to push the
frontier in behavioral price research.
In this first of a planned series of appraisals, beyond
documenting what we do and do not know, we clarify some
misconceptions, offer new insights, and provide explicit
definitions of the four fundamental core concepts behind
how people perceive, process and respond to price informa-
tion. By focusing on “price as a stimulus,” not only do we
highlight the historical basis of this research domain but also
the inception of our query into how prices influence buyer
behavior. Even with a focus only on price as a stimulus, we
are reminded that there is a vast number of issues that
behavioral price research has yet to explore. It is important
to note that given the complexity of the singular subject of
price as a stimulus, we did not intend to be exhaustive.
Rather, we have sought to question the current and excite
future research. We hope that this endeavor will spur more
research efforts that will help us understand better the
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multidimensional ways in which people respond to prices
and price information.
Some research issues
Lee (2013) succinctly identifies five key principles from this
first essay. The commentators identify some important issues
relative to this initial appraisal that deserve careful thought.
They suggest that behavioral price research would benefit
by: (1) taking a stronger information processing approach
emphasizing the role of deliberative vs. non-deliberative
processes (Adaval 2013); (2) studying the relative ease or
difficulty that price information is perceived and processed
(Rao 2013); (3) examining the role of heuristics (Thomas
2013); and (4) exploring how people form magnitude per-
ceptions (Adaval 2013; Coulter 2013; Lee 2013; Rao 2013).
Similarly, there is an exhortation for more research related to
how emotions and feelings influence people’s judgments and
decisions (Adaval 2013; Lee 2013; Rao 2013; Thomas 2013)
and how the senses of smell, taste and touch influence
people’s perceptions of price information, how the informa-
tion is processed, and eventually the outcome attributed to
decisions and choices (Coulter 2013; Rao 2013). Rather than
“an afterthought,” we had intended our statement “the emo-
tional side of price … has received little attention in re-
search” (Cheng and Monroe 2013) as an emphatic plea for
more research on the emotional side of price.
Cognition, heuristics and emotions
An important contribution stemming from behavioral price
research is the recognition that it is buyers’ perceptions that
underlie how they respond to price information (Monroe
1973). Economic models suggest “price not only influences
buyers’ expectations but also influences producers’ incen-
tives” (Klein and Leffler 1981, p. 614). Unlike a behavioral
approach, the economic approach does not invoke a
uninformed consumer making irrational or sub-optimal deci-
sions. Rather, there is an assumption of a utility-maximizing
consumer dealing with a profit-maximizing firm (Rao 2013;
Stiglitz 2012). As Simon (1989, p. 377) wondered: “How do
human beings reason when the conditions for rationality pos-
tulated by the model of neoclassical economics are not met?”
Behavioral price research offers explanations of how peo-
ple perceive price information, form value judgments and
make decisions when they do not have perfect information
about alternative choices. These explanations help us under-
stand why buyers may be more sensitive to price increases
than to price decreases, or how they respond to comparative
price advertisements, coupons, rebates, and other price pro-
motions. The underlying premise for these responses is that
buyers judge prices comparatively, or that a reference price
anchors their judgments. A reference price is a dynamic,
internal price to which an individual compares the offered
price of a product or service (Cheng and Monroe 2013). It
may be an internal price the buyer may remember from a
previous purchase, an expected price, a belief about what
would be a fair price for the product in the same market area,
or perhaps some vague notion of what the product might be
worth. Moreover, a reference price is always manifested as a
level (Cheng and Monroe 2013) and buyers may not know
consciously that a reference price is actually in their mind as
these judgments occur.
People seldom are good information processors and they
often take shortcuts (use decision heuristics) consciously and
non-consciously (Darke et al. 1995; Thomas and Morwitz
2009; Thomas 2013). “A heuristic is a strategy that ignores
part of the information, with the goal of making decisions
more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex
methods” (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p. 454). Such a
shortcut, while facilitating the choice process, actually may be
more likely to maximize value than a deliberate scrutiny of all
alternatives. It can be conscious as well as non-conscious, can
be defined as a rule, and can be more accurate than so-called
optimizing strategies (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011).
But are all apparently non-deliberative decisions the result
of a heuristic? Is it not likely that there are other reasonable
explanations for when individuals respond to stimuli to
situations in less than a “rational”way?We should be careful
about developing a list of “heuristics” or decision short cuts
based on single studies (i.e., the n=1 problem (Wells 2001)).
To illustrate, Thomas (2013) cites the “frequency of dis-
counts” heuristic based on research reported by Alba et al.
(1994, 1999). In that research, pitting one store that infre-
quently used relatively large discounts (discount magnitude)
against another store that frequently used small discounts
(discount frequency) over 36 trials, respondents judged the
frequently discounted store as having overall lower prices.
Lalwani and Monroe (2005) first replicated that experi-
ment and got very similar effects. In a second study, simply
multiplying the experimental prices by 100 (meaning the
variance of the price stimuli was invariant), they reversed
the results as the respondents then judged the infrequent
discounting store (discount magnitude) to have lower prices
overall. Their explanation for the reversal of these results
was the perceived relative salience of discount frequency in
the initial study. But with larger monetary differences be-
tween prices in the second study, it was the perceived sa-
lience of the discount magnitudes that influenced partici-
pants’ judgments.
Rather than exploring a laundry list of idiosyncratic heu-
ristics in behavioral price research, or more generally, in
consumer research, we need more comparative tests of alter-
native explanations for the suspected heuristics. Such careful
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research efforts will help to ascertain the ecological validity of
these heuristics. This prescription means we need to do more
strong tests and not use the null hypothesis as the “strawman.”
Evaluations of products may depend on different types of
information or knowledge: (a) declarative information (i.e.,
features, facts, and benefits) and (b) experiential information
(emotions and experiences evoked by the product or service)
(Esch et al. 2012). The judgments thus formed with the infor-
mation or knowledge involve both conscious feelings toward
the product/service as well as non-conscious affective influences
(Slovic et al. 2007). Feelings are an essential source of informa-
tion (Schwarz and Clore 1988; Thomas and Menon 2007).
Knowledge is the dynamic accumulation of personal as-
similation and interpretation of data and contextual informa-
tion received through the senses from experiences. It is a
basis for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and
information. All knowledge is personal and that is why we
have stipulated that the four fundamental concepts discussed
in the appraisal be defined at the individual person level.
Through learning and experience, these products and ser-
vices become “marked” by associations that are expressed
through emotions and feelings (Bechara and Damasio 2005).
Behavioral researchers from multiple perspectives agree
that the initial response to any environment is affective (pos-
itive and negative), and that the images marked by these
feelings guide subsequent customer judgments and decisions
within that environment (Davidson 2004; Lehrer 2009;
Machleit and Eroglu 2000; Slovic et al. 2007). Thus, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where “the emotional content
of numerical information is generally sterile or predictable…”
(Rao 2013). Yes, most people can judge that one number
(offer price) is more or less than another number (internal
reference price), but this judgment does not mean that a
perception of the relative expensiveness of the product has
been formed (differential price perceptual threshold reached)
or that it precludes an affective response. For example, indi-
viduals may become upset if the offer price exceeds their
reference price, or if other buyers pay less than they do.
Conversely, people may become elated if the offer price is
less than their reference price. We should also not presume
that buyers always notice a price change or that they prefer
lower prices. These are research issues that have not been
extensively studied and will be reviewed in our next essay.
An information processing approach
Can these seemingly myriad suggestions for future behav-
ioral price research be integrated in a single perspective? To
illustrate, we offer the figure below. This figure is an aug-
mented stimulus–response model indicating the process be-
gins with an initial exposure to price information and dem-
onstrates the process we describe in the essay. Briefly, the
manner in which price information is initially presented to
buyers will influence their psychological, physiological, and
emotional reactions inducing sensations (Adaval 2013;
Coulter 2013). Individuals must interpret (construe) these
sensations, leading to their perceptions of the information.
This process of interpretation may or may not involve cog-
nitive deliberation. We are reminded that our reactions are
always subject to our interpretation of the environment with-
in a system of beliefs that we assimilate through personal
experiences (Fig. 1).
Central to studying price information processing is to un-
derstand how people encode and represent price and price-
related information in their minds. Coulter (2013) and Rao
(2013) highlight this issue as we do in our first appraisal. The
important price memory research area may have led to some
mistaken conclusions about whether people can or do remem-
ber prices of items that they have purchased (Monroe and Lee
1999). Previous price memory research assumes that the Ar-
abic numerals would be encoded and represented in buyers’
minds exactly in symbolic form. When buyers do not recall
the actual symbols accurately, researchers have inferred that
the buyers have not attended to price information when mak-
ing their choices. We indicate in this first essay that such
inferences perhaps are not warranted because buyers may
encode and represent the price information in memory as
approximations (e.g. less than $100) or as evaluations (e.g.,
not expensive). Also, working memory capacity is limited and
information decays within 2–3 s unless it is rehearsed
(Baddeley 2000; Vanhuele et al. 2006). Simply, recall is an
inadequate measure of how fluent recently encountered price
information may be in a buyer’s memory (Mazumdar and
Monroe 1990, 1992; Monroe and Lee 1999; Thomas 2013).
Buyers compare prices, make calculations and estimates
when evaluating options and making choices. Research indi-
cates that they may not always handle these tasks effortlessly or
Fig. 1 A process model of behavioral response to price stimulus
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accurately (Chen and Rao 2007). Moreover, studies indicate
that people have difficulty making calculations relative to
everyday living and that they often avoid doing so, at times
choosing a heuristic to simplify their task (Suri et al. 2013;
Thomas 2013). Buyers also may simply make a purchase
choice reactively (or emotionally) without deliberation.
Relating the two price differential thresholds
Lee (2013) notes the seemingly non-intuitive implications
stemming from Eq. (10) in Cheng and Monroe (2013).
K ¼ ΔI
.
P ref ¼ ΔD
.
P ref −ΔD ð10Þ
where K is the constant of proportionality,
Pref is the individual’s reference price
ΔI is the increase in price, and
ΔD is the decrease in price.
Having studied the translations of the original writings of
Bernoulli, Weber and Fechner, it is clear that only Bernoulli
gave any discussion to decrements. The experiments of
Weber and the subsequent mathematical formulations by
Fechner were only concerned with increments. Their re-
sponse functions, however, were concave in nature illustrat-
ing a logarithmic relationship where the change in magnitude
of a stimulus needs to be greater as the stimulus gets more
intense for an individual to notice there is a difference (just
noticeable difference). Conversely, given the concavity of
the function, it is clear from mere observation that to reach
the point of just noticeable difference (or a threshold), the
change in magnitude of a stimulus must shrink as the stim-
ulus intensity becomes less intense.
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), having
originally developed from adaptation-level theory, postulates
that the response function is concave for gains (above the
reference point) and convex for losses (below the reference
point). The authors specifically pointed out that this S-
shaped value function is steepest at the reference point. A
loss in wealth is, therefore, generally valued more negatively
than an increase in wealth of the same absolute magnitude
would be valued positively. Hence, we have the popular
belief that “losses loom larger than gains.”
In the realm of prices and price changes, an increase in price
would be considered a loss whereas a price reduction would be
considered a gain. If individuals are generally more sensitive to
losses than to gains, then people would react more readily to
price increases than to price reductions of the same magnitude.
As Eq. (10) shows, it takes a smaller absolute amount of
decrease in a price to induce a differential price perceptual
threshold than a price increase. Yet, prospect theory implies
that given the same magnitude of change, people would
respond to a price increase faster than to a price decrease.
This point brings us to the contention in Cheng and Monroe
(2013) that “at the minimum, a consumer would only re-
spond to a price decrease at the second differential price
perceptual threshold of a decrease”. This difference in re-
sponse arises because a buyer would respond faster to the
differential price perceptual threshold for a price increase
(thereby making it a differential price response threshold
also). For price decreases, therefore, more than one differen-
tial price perceptual threshold must be crossed before a
differential price response threshold is reached.
It is important to recognize that there are two kinds of
differential price thresholds, perceptual and response.
Disentangling them theoretically, methodologically, and
substantively is essential in understanding how price
changes affect buyer behavior.
Conclusion
We are gratified by the thoughtful remarks of the commenta-
tors. Their valuable points enrich this appraisal and further our
efforts in raising more questions in and bringing more attention
to the area of behavioral price research. The journey that we
have embarked on to appraise behavioral price research has
become an exciting and rewarding endeavor. This appraisal is
an extensive review, but it is neither exhaustive of all relevant
research on these four concepts, nor of behavioral price re-
search itself. In future essays, wewill continue this odyssey and
visit other important behavioral price research areas.
Of particular interest is the “ubiquitous logarithmic curve.”
In Cheng and Monroe (2013), we introduced the concepts of
two different kinds of differential price thresholds that we have
further explored in the previous section. We also mentioned
people’s innate logarithmic mental number line. Thus, there is
an additional threshold concept of research interest: the number
discrimination threshold or when two numbers are noticeably
different. We will return to this thought in the future.
While research on the reference price concept has been a
focus of considerable research efforts, inquiries relative to
the price-perceived quality relationship have been more nu-
merous (Somervuori 2012). Taking a quasi-historical ap-
proach in our next essay, we will appraise these efforts and
document how research has morphed into queries about
perceptions of value and choice.
As noted by Rao (2013), managers primarily still subscribe
to the microeconomic theory of the firm when determining
prices. The knowledge about how people perceive, process
and respond to prices and price information that behavioral
price research has produced has not been commonly applied
into practice. The four concepts that we emphasize in this
essay have not been embraced in pricing management despite
the strong evidence that the microeconomic-based approach
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with its restrictive assumptions is not ecologically valid
(Simon 1989; Stiglitz 2012). Marketing textbooks also have
not included behavioral price research insights in prescribing
managerial pricing behavior. These limitations of the accep-
tance and use of knowledge stemming from behavioral price
research is disappointing given that it is perhaps “one area that
has allowed marketing to make a contribution to other fields”
(Adaval 2013). The subject of “behavioral pricing” empha-
sizing the application of knowledge gained from behavioral
“price” research to managerial practice and public policy will
be the focus of the final piece in our series of essays to
appraise the domain of behavioral price research.
In this first appraisal essay, we concluded by presenting a
list of questions related to the phenomenon of how buyers
react to price and price changes. Rather than attempting to
address each of these questions, in the spirit of stimulating
future building blocks of research in behavioral price, future
essays in this series will relate behavioral price research to
such areas as perceptions of quality and value, perceived
price fairness, consumer motivation, marketing channels,
consumer literacy, and pricing tactics.
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